

**WYSIWYG IN TRIO:  
THE GRAMMATICALIZED EXPRESSION  
OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE**

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*Introduction*

In his paper of 1994, entitled 'WYSINWYG in Amazonia', Rivière describes the highly transformational world of, among other peoples, the Trio, in which men become jaguars or eagles and vice versa by changing their skin or clothes. Trio oral literature abounds with transformations from one state to another, making it difficult to determine whether a given character in a myth was in essence a human, an animal, or a spirit, or alternatively, for example, simply a human 'wearing jaguar's clothes'. Rivière came to the conclusion that What You See Is Not Necessarily What You Get and that 'appearances are deceptive', since appearances can be transformed, thus veiling the essence of what something is in reality. The notion of something 'being X' is not a reality as such in Trio, since it can be transformed. Linguistically speaking, however, the relationship between external appearance and inherent reality is always clearly stated in Trio by means of morphemes that chart the differences between 'being X', 'being like X', and 'having the appearance of being X'. Thus What You See is clearly marked as being intrinsically so or transitionally so.

The Trio live in a world which allows interaction with beings from other worlds, in particular the spirit world. In order for a being from the spirit world to be able to interact or enter into a social relationship with a being from 'this' world, that is, the human world, it has to be transformed into a shape that makes such a

social relationship possible—that is, it has to become human-like, taking on the shape of the human body, speaking a language, and behaving in a human-like way. In this form, it becomes almost impossible to tell this being apart from a ‘real’ human being.

Let us for a moment take a detour through a philosophical exercise and consider a situation that might occur in modern science fiction, where the world is taken over by aliens in human form who are not recognized as being anything other than human until it is too late. But perhaps, as usually happens, one bright human being discovers that the ‘humans’ he is in contact with are not really humans but aliens, and he tries to tell this discovery to his fellow humans. How does he do this? Quite a few eyebrows are raised among his fellow humans when he says: ‘Well, I know these people look like humans and act like humans, but they are not *really* humans, they are not exactly humans.’ A lively discussion on the meaning of the word ‘human’ then ensues, but it is doubtful whether our real human is able to explain how someone could be very nearly but not quite human. One reason for this is that our Standard Average European languages are ill-equipped to deal with the possibility of different world truths, or with situations co-existing in our world of (relatively) straightforward truth and knowledge, that are discernible by either introspection or by means outside ourselves, that is, through physics or the observation of behaviour. The Trio language, however, has all the mechanisms necessary for encoding interaction both within our human world and with other possible worlds. The mechanisms they use both track the paths between the worlds and are a means of identifying a ‘this-world’ or alternatively an other-world protagonist.

The present paper is designed to elucidate the linguistic means used to express or indicate knowledge, beliefs, and realities as conceived by the Trio. More specifically, I shall look at the attitude of the Trio to knowledge as expressed linguistically by asking the questions: What is truth? What is a state of affairs? In short, how do the Trio express their awareness of possible conflicting realities in the real or imagined world(s)?<sup>1</sup>

To return to our starting-point, we perceive the world around us by using our senses, forming beliefs and categorizing the world according to, and on the basis of, the data we receive in doing so. The linguistic structures we use to do so reflect this categorization and ordering of beliefs and possible truths or realities. We can start by taking a situation that occurs regularly to all of us, for instance, seeing a human being in front of us. By means of the visual system, we perceive a human being. But what is it exactly that we perceive? What we perceive may be a human being, but it might as well be something else that looks like a human being, per-

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haps a facsimile human being, a being which manifests itself as a human. How can we know or be sure? According to McDowell (1988: 210), 'Any capacity to tell by looking how things are in the world independent of oneself can at best be fallible. [...] the argument is that since there can be deceptive cases experientially indistinguishable from non-deceptive cases, one's experiential intake—what one embraces in the scope of one's consciousness—must be the same in both kinds of case.'

Knowledge and identity have been the subjects of many debates in philosophy, and I do not intend to add to the confusion here. My aim is simply to look at what kind of knowledge is expressed in Trio, in particular the knowledge encoded in a state of affairs, and more specifically, whether the image in front of us that we perceive to be a human being really is a human being, or whether it is a facsimile human. We shall see that it cannot be known what the inherent state in a state of affairs actually is, nor can it be made known by means of experiential intake to an experiencing subject. However, if we take as given the fact that there is a cognitive mechanism to distinguish between incompatible states of affairs in the environment, then there must exist alternative possible worlds to allow us to distinguish between a human and a facsimile human or a manifest human, for the manifestly human to be possible at all. This brings us to the question of (a) whether the Trio distinguish linguistically between other-world and this-world protagonists, and (b) how they reconcile interaction between worlds from a linguistic point of view.

Let us enter the Trio's transformational world. How do we know whether a character in a Trio myth is human or manifestly human? If we take the word 'know' in its early meaning, we find that it means to 'distinguish', that is, to distinguish the truth from all other possible alternatives, or to put it less strongly, all possible *relevant* alternatives. The Trio language allows, indeed even compels its speakers to encode propositional attitudes such as certainty, doubt, and belief, as well as truth and knowledge, in such a way that a distinction is made linguistically between truth stemming from both the human and non-human worlds. Thus anything which is not inherently that which it denotes, say *witoto* 'human being', if it comes from an 'other-world' reality, is marked by the facsimile marker *-me*. To return to our alien, what appears to us to be a human may not necessarily have the intrinsic qualities associated with being 'human'. The distinction between outer appearance and intrinsic quality is a ubiquitous conceptual grammatical category in Trio. Is, then, the denotee *witoto-me* human or not? I should like to argue that it is human, but only in an alternative world to the one we are used to dealing with. Thus the meaning of the word will acquire an additional reading according to the world in which it is placed.

Let us now look at some of the elements in Trio that make a distinction between different-world realities possible. I devote much of this paper to *-me*, which marks facsimile (state), that is, non-inherent or transient states. The marker *-me* has been translated as 'like' or 'as', yet it contrasts with the particle *apo*, which is

also translatable as 'like' but meaning 'like in behaviour'. This I shall discuss later. The final two elements discussed here are *-rë*, an assertive marker which could be translated as 'really' and which is used to assert one's beliefs; and *-re*, which is used in Trio as a corrective expectation marker, that is, to indicate that one's expectations have not been met. This marker has been labelled 'frustrative' in the analysis of other Cariban languages. The Trio speak in beliefs and are aware of the co-existence and interaction of different worlds. Thus when making an assertion in the form of an indicative sentence, its truth beliefs, and sometimes verifiers, will necessarily be encoded in that sentence. It should be noted that the grammatical markers dealt with in this paper do not allow a translation into one of our Standard Average European languages that would fully capture the concept involved. Indeed, in works from the early seventeenth century, morphemes with similar functions, called data-source markers by Hardman (1986: 113), were said to be 'ornate particles' without which 'the sentence is perfectly fine'.

#### *The Facsimile Marker -me*

The facsimile marker *-me* can be suffixed to nominals, that is, to nouns, demonstrative pronouns, and nominalized verbs, and also to the particle *apo*, 'like', when it is preceded by one of the nominals. Gildea (1998) has referred to this marker as an 'attributivizer'. However, in this paper I prefer to gloss it as 'facsimile marker'.

What I describe here is a series of uses of *-me*, showing a development in meanings and functions from one of marking a noun as not being intrinsically what is denoted by the noun—that is, as being a 'variable under certain yet-to-be-defined conditions'—to being an ultimately grammaticalized usage of *-me*. Under what conditions is *-me* required in Trio? For the present I shall restrict myself to its use with nouns and demonstrative pronouns. There are basically three situations that require a noun to be marked by *-me*, with three interrelated functions, namely one given below under (a) with an indicating function, under (b) with the function of falsifying a previous belief, and under (c) with the function of an attitudinal proposition:

- (a) when you know that an object is not what it seems (indicating function);
- (b) to refer to an object that you took to be something else (falsifier of previous belief);
- (c) to indicate your uncertainty as to the identity of an object (attitudinal proposition).

The bottom line is that language categorizes to the extent that features from a possible but unreal or spirit world are already indicated in the foreground. Anything that is not apparent or not reliably identifiable by means of sensory intake is so marked. Thus, for example, if you see figures approaching but you cannot read-

ily see that they are human beings, then you clearly say so in Trio.<sup>2</sup> Thus grammar becomes a means not only to categorize the world, but also to codify it accordingly.

We can now look at an example of situation (a) as defined above. This usage occurs mainly in stories and myths, when characters are moving between worlds and transforming themselves into humans or something else. Example 1 is an utterance that was made about a shaman who had/has the ability to transform himself into a jaguar, thus becoming a facsimile jaguar, or manifestly a jaguar:<sup>3</sup>

- (1) *kaikui-me n-emeta-Ø-n*  
 jaguar-FACS.3→-transform-PRES-EVID  
 he changes into a jaguar

In (1) it is not possible to omit the suffix *-me* and express the same meaning, nor indeed would it result in a grammatically acceptable utterance. After transformation has taken place (a very common occurrence in the oral literature dealing with spirits or animals that have turned into human beings) the transformed character is marked as not inherently being what he appears to be. For instance, in example 2 the spider-monkey was transformed and has become a human being:

- (2) *witoto-me tese*  
 human.being-FACS he.was  
 he was manifestly a human being

Example 2 does not mean 'he was like a human being', which would be expressed with the particle *apo* (see below). Rather, it indicates that for all intents and purposes, this person was a human being but not inherently so. In other words, when a transformation takes place, the result is a facsimile of the target character. Is the facsimile human being truly a human being or not? The only possible answer is, yes and no: yes, since for the people it meets it is always taken to be a human, and this is one of the reasons why the transformed character can interact with humans and enter into social relationships with them; no, since, truth is rela-

<sup>2</sup> I am leaving aside for the moment the observation that you can never be sure of what is under the skin of that human-like creature, real human or spirit. In Trio mythology protagonists frequently 'transform' themselves by donning the outer casing, that is, clothes, skin, feathers, etc., of the target character.

<sup>3</sup> The symbols and abbreviations used in the examples are: →: acting/ acting on, e.g., 1→2: 1<sup>st</sup> person acting on 2<sup>nd</sup> person, 3→: 3<sup>rd</sup> person acting, intransitive verb; ANAPH: anaphoric; ANIM: animate; ASSERT: assertion; COREF: co-referential; DEMPRO: demonstrative pronoun; EU: euphonic; EVID: evidential; FACS: facsimile; FRUST: frustrative; FUT: future; HORT: hortative; IMP: imperative; INSTR: instrumental; LOC: locative; NEG: negation; NF: non-finite; PL: plural; POSS: possessive; PRES: present; PRO: pronoun.

tive to the possible world that allows it and since truth is not knowledge. Said differently, it is not a human being but a facsimile; the outer casing is human, but the character is not intrinsically human. This is further illustrated in example 3, where a man is faced with his wife, who has been taken over by a spirit. Although she has the outward appearance of being his wife, or is apparently his wife, in reality she is merely a facsimile.

- (3) *j-ipi-ta nai j-ipi-me*  
 1POSS-wife-NEG s/he.is 1POSS-wife-FACS  
 my (apparent) wife is not my wife

Situation (b) above can be illustrated further with example 4 where again the noun must be marked with *-me*. This example shows that the belief previously held by the speaker that the character he was shooting at was an animal turns out to be inconsistent with reality. The hunter saw a facsimile animal.

- (4) *mēhparē-me k-ēkanī-ja-e*  
 animal-FACS 1→2-think-PRES-EVID  
 I thought you were an (game) animal

The utterance given in example 5 exemplifies situation (c), which was the answer to the question of what was approaching at dusk.

- (5) *witoto-me nai*  
 human.being-FACS it.is  
 it looks like a human being (it could be a human being)

Since the speaker is not quite sure what is approaching—that is, he cannot see clearly; it may be dark or foggy—all he can say is that what is approaching looks to him like a human being. However, what he sees may very well be logically distinct from his perceptual experience of it. In this case, *-me* indicates one's uncertainty as to the identity of the object, that is, one's awareness of the fact that truth is relative to the experiential intake of the cognizer, and that a belief of what the truth is depends to some degree on this intake. If, for example, you are walking through the forest and you meet a man whom you can see clearly and to whom you can attribute a characteristic set of features (bipedal, two arms, legs, male anatomy, little body hair etc.), then on the basis of that perceptual sense-datum, and in the absence of any other contradictory features, whether behavioural or anatomical, you will likely conclude that what you see is a man. In addition, this is what you will continue to believe until such time as your belief clashes with reality. Things exist independently from our seeing them, so, logically speaking, we can only state a belief that is causally dependent on a perception sense-datum,

leaving open the possibility that it might not coincide with what exists outside of that sense-datum, that is, in reality. In example 5, we are dealing with a facsimile marker, not with a change of state or transformation: that is to say, the marker *-me* is not only found in myths but in the everyday spoken language.

With the above description in mind, we can now explain example 6:

- (6) *pijanaroi-rëken i-kewei-me tese tuna-hkao*  
 liana.sp-ONLY 3POSS-fish.hook-FACS it.was water-LOC  
 for fish hooks he only used the liana in the water

In example 6, we discern a slight development in meaning or usage, whereby the facsimile marker has rather less to do with appearance and more to do with function: the liana functioned as a fish-hook, it was used to catch fish.<sup>4</sup>

Examples from (1) to (6) show the facsimile reading of the marker *-me*, that is, the facsimile-marked noun indicates an unreal state of being something one inherently or possibly is not. We may now look at *-me* with other nominal categories, namely with a demonstrative pronoun, as shown in example 7:

- (7) *irë apo nai, irë-me tiwarë eh-të*  
 DEMPRO LIKE it.is, DEMPRO-FACS aware be-IMP  
 that's the way it is, so (that imagined/supposed state) beware!

The construction *irë-me* (DEMPRO-FACS) has now become lexicalized to mean simply 'so', as well as 'being that'. The literal meaning of *irë*, used here as an anaphoric demonstrative pronoun, refers back to the preceding statement or statements. Thus the speaker is saying: 'A state exists with regard to which I have the belief that it is a state of such and such a kind.' A state is not a universal, at least in philosophical terms. Rather, it is a temporal process, in linguistic terms a situation, and the element marked by *-me* extracts from that state a moment that is taken as a static picture of that stage. Perhaps the most pertinent context where one can see the transient nature of a state is in the expression of possession. In Trio, there are two possibilities for expressing possession or ownership, using *-me* as in example 8, or a possessive construction with the instrumental marker *-ke* as in example 9 below:

- (8) *paruru Ø-entu-me wae*  
 banana 3POSS-owner-FACS I.am  
 I have bananas

<sup>4</sup> Liana species are stamped and beaten, the poisonous fibres then being released into the water, causing vaso-constriction in the fish, which come to the surface of the water and can easily be caught in nets or by hand.

(9) *tī-papa-ke nai*<sup>5</sup>

COREF-father-INSTR he.is

he has a father (literally, he is fathered, with a father)

At first sight one might think along the lines of inalienable possession. However, this is only part of the story, since one can also say:

(10) *tī-j-aparuru-ke nai*

COREF-EU-banana-INSTR he.is

he has bananas

The alienable/inalienable distinction as an explanation does not work here, since the *tī-□-ke* construction can be used with almost any noun. Both constructions can be translated into English as 'I have/he has', yet there is a major difference in meaning between the two. The construction given in (8) is used to indicate that one has something 'extra', that is, enough to give away to someone else; thus the object in question can 'change hands', and the ownership is transient. Thus the meaning of the question *paruru entu-me mana-n* is not just 'Have you got bananas?'; rather, it is 'Have you got some bananas for me?', in which case, if the answer is affirmative, the ownership is a changeable state. The possessed item thus does not inherently belong to the present possessor, since he is about to give it away: it is simply something that belongs to the owner at the present time. Trio society demands that those who have something in abundance must share it if asked. The use of *-me* indicates a currently existing, but not necessarily constant state. If we take it that we and life around us are composed of a series of states, then what we have is a commentary on a momentary stage in the state of owning as opposed to a universal truth.

*Grammaticalized -me*

The present section looks at some instances of grammaticalization from a facsimile (non-inherent) marker to an aspectual one. In the process of language development, the marker *-me* has come to take on more grammatical functions. For instance, it marks a state on modifying nouns in predicative constructions, as in

<sup>5</sup> The grammatical status of the prefix *tī-* in these examples is that of a semantically bleached personal prefix that is used to indicate co-referentiality with the subject of the predication. The same prefix is found in the verbal system filling the personal prefix slot, the verb then taking the final suffix *-se* or one of its allomorphs.



example 11, where the modifying noun *mono* 'big' is marked with *-me*, signalling that someone is in a 'state of being big'.<sup>6</sup>

- (11) *mono-me nai*  
 big-FACS he.is  
 he is big

The path leading to such a case of grammaticalization also hinges, of course, on the state-like or inchoative-stative semantics of, for example, the adjectival category.

We can contrast (11) with the attributive function of the adjectival noun in example 12, where *-me* is not permitted:

- (12) *mono konopo n-e-ja-n*  
 big rain 3→3-come-PRES-EVID  
 heavy rain is coming

Another grammaticalized use of *-me* is the stative aspectual meaning in deverbal constructions.<sup>7</sup> Compare examples 13 and 14 where in (13) the state of seeing is profiled and the person who is seeing is marked as a dative experiencer of the state (this is the so-called ergative structure of Trio). In example 14 the people involved are hunters who were still roasting meat when it got dark, 'roasting' now being taken as a moment in the process of roasting, namely that moment at which darkness fell.

- (13) *ë-ene-kon-me wi-ja*  
 2POSS-see-POSS.PL-FACS 1-GOAL  
 I see you (pl.) (right now)

- (14) *aanoka-me-to ti-komain-je*  
 roast-FACS-PL COREF-get.dark-NF  
 roasting it dusked them, i.e., it got dark and they were (still) roasting<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> A similar marker exists in other Cariban languages. Williams (1932: 55), for example, recognized similar meanings associated with the marker *-be* in Makushi (Makúchi). He says: 'where we say "the man is good", they have to use *be* which signifies something like "in the state of", "the state of".'

<sup>7</sup> Note that aspect in Trio can only be marked on a 'de-verbal', i.e. nominalized verb form.

<sup>8</sup> The verbal plural marker for the third person *-to* is a clitic that is ideally is not marked on the verb itself but is cliticized to the immediately preceding element if this is not a plain noun.

*-me versus apo*

Finally, before leaving *-me* as a conceptual category and its grammatical features, I should like to return to the difference between it and the modal particle *apo*, both of which may be translated into English as 'like'. Whereas a noun marked by *-me* indicates facsimile or non-inherent, transient state in its original meaning, *apo* is used to indicate a resemblance in manner but not in appearance. Many of the occurrences of *apo* in texts are with the demonstrative pronouns, e.g. *irë/serë apo nai* (that/this like it is), 'that/this is how it is'; or it can modify a noun in a clause of the form 'he Verb like...', where *apo* refers to the action of the verb, that is, 'to act like, as if', as in examples 15 and 16 below:

(15) *t-ëna-se i-ja ërukë apo*

COREF-eat-NF 3-GOAL caterpillar LIKE  
he ate like a caterpillar (i.e. he ate leaves)

(16) *i-warë-to apo tese*

3-know-PL LIKE it.was  
(he acted) as if he knew (these things)

The other markers that we need to look at in order to complete the present picture of how the Trio use their language to express their attitude to the world they live in are *-rë* and *-re*, assertive and frustrative markers respectively. In this paper I am leaving out of consideration the evidential marking that occurs on finite verbs in the non-present tenses, indicating knowledge or certainty. Underlying the concept of this type of evidential marking in Trio, there is the notion of solipsism, that is, only the self, or only states experienced by the speaker himself, are knowable.<sup>9</sup> States experienced by all other persons can be expressed or indicated, but they can never be 'known' by another.

<sup>9</sup> Note that a first-person conjugated verb of action also expresses the 'state' of a speaker. A statement such as 'I am going' contains a degree of particular egocentric knowledge for the speaker that a statement such as 'he is going' does not. Taking as a premise Russell's definition (1995: 204) of the three purposes of language as '(1) to *indicate* facts, (2) to *express* the state of the speaker, (3) to *alter* the state of the hearer', then a statement of the kind 'he is going' can only express the state of the speaker in the sense that the speaker is being affected by an observation, and indicate the state of, in this case, the goer. Thus there is no overlap of egocentric knowledge, that is, *I* cannot know what state *he* is in while he is doing something. This fact is encoded in Trio by means of an evidential marker after the tense marker, *-e* for a speech act participant and *-n* for a third person. The uncertainty of anyone else's state, and of one's own in interrogative clauses, is always indicated by *-n* or *-në*, as in *antae wütën?*, 'Which path should I go along?'

*The clitics -rë and -re*

The clitic *-rë* is used as an assertive marker and can be suffixed to nominals and verbals. To take our example of the human being again, to stress the fact that it is a human being as opposed to something else, it can be used as an assertive, as in example 17, where the speaker is committing himself to the truth of his statement, claiming certainty of a state of affairs. At the same time, *-rë* is used to assert an action or event, as in example 18, where the speaker is expressing his commitment that, if certain conditions are fulfilled, those addressed will be recompensed.

(17) *witoto-rë-rë nërë*

human.being-ASSERT-ASSERT 3PRO.ANIM.ANAPH  
he was exactly (really) a human being

(18) *irë m-apë-hta-hki-rë*

DEMPRO 2→3-get-FUT-PL-ASSERT  
you (pl.) will get that

The clitic *-re*, on the other hand, which in the literature on other Cariban languages has been termed a frustrative marker, is used in Trio as a corrective expectation marker—that is, the expectations which arise from the expressed proposition are designated incorrect and thus as not corresponding to reality. Here again, truth is not an absolute datum; rather, it is relative to a possible world, namely that of the expectations of the speaker. The marker *-re* is used to indicate that one's expectations, intentions or wishes as expressed in the proposition are not realized. To illustrate this point, in example 19 *wateese-re* is used to describe a particular spider species found in Amazonia that sheds its skin. On the basis of the apparent skeletal remains of the spider, one would think or expect it to be dead, whereas in fact it is not, but has simply moved out of its skin.

(19) *wateese-re*

dead-FRUST  
it is not dead (although you might think or expect it is)

The use of *-re* in example 19 contrasts with the negation marker *-ta* in so far as *-ta* in *wateese-ta*, 'it is not dead', negates an affirmative statement rather than a belief. Thus *-re* expresses a state of the speaker, rather than indicating a fact in the way that the negation marker does. The marker *-ta* falsifies the utterance *wateese*, 'it is dead', while the marker *-re* corrects a belief or expectation. The frustrative marker can be combined with the assertion marker as in example 20, where it is first asserted that the character in question is a human being. Subsequently, the assertion is relativized to being close to the truth but is ultimately a non-truth—that is, the character was not totally a human being, although one could have taken

him to be so. Example 20 can be taken to be synonymous with *witoto-me* in examples 2 and 5 above, example 20 differing only in the degree of belief resulting from the assertion-marked noun predicate.

(20) *witoto-rë-rë-re nërë*

human-ASSERT-ASSERT-FRUST 3PRO.ANIM.ANAPH

he wasn't exactly a human being

Since the frustrative can also be marked on verbs, the non-realization of the hoped-for or expected outcome of the action as encoded in the verb is immediately made known. This fact excludes any sort of climax or sudden unexpected turns of event in a Trio story. Thus, in example 21, where the speaker is telling about an encounter between the Trio and the Okomoyana in which the Trio suggested that the two groups be friendly trading partners, we know immediately that the suggestion was not taken up, since the verb making the suggestion is marked by the frustrative. The statement 'Let us be friends' was uttered in vain, it did not have the expected or wished-for effect, and already this statement tells us that war is about to begin. The result in the case of example 21 was that the Okomoyana killed many Trio.

(21) *ëi-pawana-me-rëken k-e-htëne ni-ka-Ø-re*

REFL-friend-FACS-ONLY DUAL-be-HORT.PL 3→3-say-PST-FRUST

'let's be friends' we said in vain

Note that in contrast to the counter-expectation markers found in other languages, the expectations that are thwarted here are not based on pre-existing norms or standards; rather, they arise out of the utterance itself. That is to say, on a meta-level the Trio distinguish between statements or assertions about the object that is perceived and statements of truth or falsehood about a statement itself, that is, a proposition. Thus, in example 19 the speaker is not saying, 'The spider is not dead'. Rather, he is commenting on the statement 'The spider is dead' by declaring it to be false.

*Conclusion*

In conclusion, the three markers *-me*, *-rë*, and *-re* are all related to different aspects of the expression of truth and reality in any number of possible worlds. The Trio can thus differentiate between facsimile constructions, real present-world elements, and elements that turn out to be contrary to our expectations, that is, unfulfilled possibilities which are ultimately non-truths in a possible world. The main difference between the facsimile *-me* and the frustrative *-re* lies in the fact that,

while both are non-realities, the frustrative marker indicates the unrealized expectations, hopes, or wishes of the speaker or participants involved as they set these out in the proposition.

We should be happy that the stories for The X-Files are not written by a Trio, since the search for the truth would be a short one indeed. For the Trio, the truth is indeed out there, in all kinds of different possible worlds, encoded in such grammatical morphemes as *-me*, *-rë*, and *-re*.

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